Tuesday, January 09, 2007

electronic voting machine technology vs paper ballot

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Saul Iversen Posted on Wednesday, November 15, 2006 - 03:39 pm:

I disagree with this statement: "An auditing mechanism cannot catch nefarious actions. Nefarious software inserted in the DRE will just arrange things so everything written into the audit looks fine." Have you reviewed the end-to-end transaction audit system devised by VoteHere/Dategrity? It is simply not true with such a system for the computer to change anything and have it not be detected. This system is unique. It isn't based on traditional security measures. You can send voter ballots deliberately through nefarious hands and catch any changes that are attempted.

Saul Iversen Posted on Wednesday, November 15, 2006 - 06:13 pm

It handles the specific scenario you describe quite effectively. See here on Black Box on this thread (which still remains on the front page):


You'll see a Word document I have posted which helps to elucidate how the protocol works.

Also find information on the web here:


After you review my word document posted here on BBV, I can entertain any questions you might have.

Saul Iversen

But don't you see Catherine that detection of problems in any type of voting system (whether paper or electronic) can be effected with an end-to-end transaction audit? So we don't have to compare paper to electronic any longer on those grounds?


Also see the discussion


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