Showing posts with label David Dill. Show all posts
Showing posts with label David Dill. Show all posts

Thursday, May 17, 2007

David Dill vs Nancy Tobi On Holt HR 811

For our information

It's Time to Outlaw Paperless Electronic Voting in the U.S. (13 comments ) by David Dill 4-29-2007

Four years ago, when I began publicly opposing paperless electronic voting, passing a federal law to require voter-verified paper records (VVPRs) seemed an impossible dream. Rep. Rush Holt introduced such a bill in 2003, and another in 2005, but both bills languished in committee until the clock ran out.

The dream is now achievable, due in part to the unending stream of problems caused by paperless voting machines in recent years.

HR 811, the third incarnation of the Holt bill, is a critical measure needed to protect the integrity of our elections, and it now has very good prospects of being enacted. It already has 210 co-sponsors in the House, where only 218 votes are required to pass it.
There are two provisions in HR 811 that are especially vital for restoring trust in American elections: A nationwide requirement for voter-verified paper records, and stringent random manual counts of those records, to make sure they agree with the announced vote totals. The requirements in the Holt bill are superior to those in almost every state of the country (there are now 22 states with significant amounts of paperless electronic voting, and only 13 states require random audits of VVPRs).

Success is not assured, however. The forces that have blocked previous bills are still active, especially vendors of current poorly performing equipment. Also, various concerns, reasonable and otherwise, have been raised about the bill by other parties.

Some groups insist on optical scan machines, which read and count hand-marked paper ballots, and are not supporting HR 811 because it still allows the use of touch-screen machines. However, under HR 811, those machines must be equipped with so-called voter-verifiable paper trails, which print a paper copy of the vote that can be reviewed by the voter before being cast. Most of the current generation of inferior paper-trail machines would not be allowed under HR 811, which requires the machines to preserve the privacy of voters and requires the VVPRs to be printed on high-quality paper. This will create a strong incentive for local jurisdictions to purchase optical scan equipment. Furthermore, HR 811 makes the paper records the official ballots of record in audits and recounts, and requires election officials to post a notice explaining to voters the need to verify their VVPRs.

I would personally prefer to see optical scan machines be used nationwide, if supplemented by equipment to allow voters with disabilities to vote privately. If groups objecting to HR 811 can cause such a bill to be introduced and line up the votes in Congress to get it passed, that bill will have my support. Meanwhile, those of us who have actually talked to Congressional staff have not seen any significant support for such a requirement. It seems that we have a choice between HR 811 or continuation of our current "Kafka-esque" paperless system (as a French politician recently described it).

Another small but noisy contingent is opposing HR 811, sometimes without revealing their true agenda, because they will be satisfied only with a nationwide system of hand-counted paper ballots. In theory, we could adopt hand-counting of all ballots. However, hand counting is rarely used now. It is politically unrealistic to believe that the overwhelming number of jurisdictions that have been using automated voting in various forms for 40 years or more are going to go back to hand counting. HR 811 does not prevent hand counting for those communities who want to do it, but it provides a realistic solution for the rest of us...

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-dill/its-time-to-outlaw-paper_b_47202.html

http://avi-rubin.blogspot.com/2007/04/david-dills-excellent-essay-on-holt.html



Shame on all of you for mistaking technology for democracy


http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/043007T.shtml

Rebuttal to Dill's Support of the HR 811 Trojan Horse
By Nancy Tobi OpEd News Friday 27 April 2007

...Dill writes:

"There are two provisions in HR 811 that are especially vital for restoring trust in American elections: A nationwide requirement for voter-verified paper records, and stringent random manual counts of those records, to make sure they agree with the announced vote totals."
Dill is correct in that we need to have auditable paper in our elections. He is incorrect in stating we need to have paper "records" (as opposed to ballots), but at least he is honest enough to make the differentiation. The Holt Bill itself disingenuously refers to "paper ballots" throughout the bill, even while referring only to paper printouts generated by a computerized voting machine.

But I believe that if Holt had produced an ingenuous "paper trail" bill with only the two items Dill mentions above, it is highly unlikely the bill would be receiving such a wide swath of broad based opposition.

(And it should be noted here that the bill is opposed by a strange group of often oppositional bedfellows: the voting industry, the National Association of Secretaries of States, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the National Association of Counties, The Election Center, the American Association of Persons with Disabilities, and election integrity activist organizations and individuals nationwide.)

It is doubtful that, had the bill only contained the two items Dill points to, it would be receiving such strong opposition even from those citizens Dr. Dill claims have a "hidden agenda" for hand counting.

I will not belabor the particular issue of hand counting that he raises - in somewhat of a sidelong manner - in his piece, but it is worth rebutting his positioning of it.

Those patriotic Americans who support hand counted paper ballot elections, of which I include myself, support hand count elections because we have spent considerable time over the past several years analyzing requirements - not for TECHNOLOGOLICAL elections - but for DEMOCRATIC elections.

After several years of rigorous debate, dialog, dissent, and discussion, after years of this evolutionary thought by patriotic American citizens, we have arrived at the simple conclusion that democratic elections require citizen oversight of the entire voting process, and that this is impossible when computers - with their processes invisible to the human eye - are involved. In other words, we have come right back to what the founders of our nation and the framers of our early state constitutions understood full well, which is why both the Massachusetts and New Hampshire constitutions state that our votes must be "sorted and counted" in "open meeting".

This raises doubt as well on optical scanners, which, as Dr. Dill full well knows, have been the perpetrators of at least as much electoral crime, fraud, and failure as the touch screens he derides in his piece...

http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/043007T.shtml


Bev Harris Black Box Voting:

HR 811: Representative Lofgren's substitute amendment

the new version is NOT improved! It's actually worse than its predecessor.

UNPRECEDENTED POWER GRAB

- It rides roughshod over the Constitutional rights of the states, by taking the unprecedented step of recommending that states violate their own state laws if needed in order to comply with the bill. It then says the states can catch up with their own laws later.

Let me explain just how wrong-headed this is, and "wrong-headed" is a polite term for "power grab":

Laws are supposed to be passed following a deliberative process. That deliberative process is not supposed to have a foregone conclusion, and if it does, the deliberative process is just a sham process. So, when the federal government encroaches on the fundamental checks and balances giving certain powers to the states, by telling the states to violate their own state laws, and then says "you can change your laws to match later", that is saying "do a sham deliberative process with a foregone conclusion" to create your legislative changes...

http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/36349/47369.html?1179416469


Related

Avi Rubin's Blog
Thursday, April 26, 2007
David Dill's excellent essay on the Holt Bill


http://avi-rubin.blogspot.com/2007/04/david-dills-excellent-essay-on-holt.html

May 10th, 2007
Paper trail bill voted out of House committee. Would such a law have prevented Sarasota?
Posted by ZDNet Government @ May 10, 2007 @ 9:25 PM

Categories: Government technology, Congress, Elections


http://government.zdnet.com/?p=3137

Wednesday, January 10, 2007

David Dill on paper ballots and hand counts

http://www.american.edu/ia/cfer/0418test/dill.pdf

Comments used in Chester County recount case

Big hopes to upset a tiny lead in ChescoThe GOP is almost certain to challenge the hair's-breadth margin - 0.1% - Democrats hold in the 156th District.
By Carrie Budoff Inquirer Staff Writer

excerpt

The 156th District, which encircles West Chester, has become the focal point of a statewide power struggle over the House of Representatives.

Royer came out of Election Day with a 19-vote lead, but a subsequent count of absentee ballots threw the edge to Smith. The outcome of this one race has left the 203-member chamber in limbo, with Republicans urging caution and Democrats claiming House control for the first time in 12 years.

A Chester County Court judge will decide whether to grant a recount and how it would be performed once Republicans - as they said they would - file a recount request by tomorrow's deadline.

While election experts agree a recount should be done, they disagree over which method - counting the paper ballots by hand or by machine - would be more accurate.

Ansolabehere favors a machine count, citing the likelihood of human error that comes with a manual review. "I know computer scientists love hand-counted paper. Go with the optical scanners."

David L. Dill, a computer science professor at Stanford University and founder of VerifiedVoting.org, a nonpartisan advocacy group, said he prefers a human count.

"You want to go slowly and carefully; you have multiple people watching it," he said. "You are only counting one race on the ballot. The careful hand count takes longer and takes more effort but will be much more accurate."

The number of "undervotes" - instances where voters didn't make a selection in the race, but did make choices in other contests - serves as a barometer for possible counting problems. There were 273 undervotes, or about 1 percent of the total.

http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/news/local/16164903.htm

discussions

David Dill responds on BBV forum

Posted on Friday, January 20, 2006 - 06:12 pm:

More

Posted on Saturday, January 21, 2006 - 03:07 pm:

I don't think that means we should eliminate machines. There is a significant part of the activist component that believes we should go back to all hand counting. That's ok in theory, and even in practice in rural areas in the U.S., but it has several problems. One is that it ALSO requires careful procedures and lots of auditing, because those human counters can make mistakes and cheat. Some people have proposed hand counting all the ballots at the polling places right after the close of the election. It would be HARD to mobilize enough observers to watch this process at every precinct! Also, it seems to be a tough sell. Finally, it doesn't seem BETTER than optical scan with extensive auditing, which seems to me to have a much better chance of working out...


http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/73/17084.html

do not miss this discussion

http://www.bbvforums.org/cgi-bin/forums/board-auth.cgi?file=/1954/15595.html

Just the kind of stuff we need to know - who is who?

Among computer scientists who have achieved renown in the voting integrity movement, in general, the following scientists are against crypto:

Dr. Rebecca Mercuri
Dr. Barbara Simons (at least last time I talked to her about it, which was in August).
Dr. Herbert Thompson (at least, last time I talked to him about VoteHere, which was in a cab in Washington D.C. in late September)

Those who have been for the crypto solution:
Dr. David Dill
Dr. Avi Rubin
Dr. David Jefferson
Dr. David Chaum (has his own crypto solution, a company called Votegrity)

However, Drs. Dill, Rubin and Jefferson who have been favorable to VoteHere in the past say it is NOT ready for prime time now.

One more question: Has anyone heard of a crypto solution combined with mail-in ballots? That may be in the works, and I'd like to find out more about it.

(Message edited by Bev_Harris on January 10, 2005)


David Dill responds in his first post on Wednesday, January 19, 2005 - 04:33 pm:

http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/72/1948.html?1122526050

More from Kim Alexander

http://www.calvoter.org/news/blog/2005_05_01_blogarchive.html


http://www.google.com/search?q=david+dill+careful+hand+count&hl=en&sourceid=gd&rls=GGLD,GGLD:2006-40,GGLD:en

Monday, January 08, 2007

Election Report analysis notable findings all around

ESI's Report on the VVPAT
Friday, August 18 Dan Tokaji


Earlier this week, the Election Science Institute (ESI) released this report regarding the use of an electronic voting system with a contemporaneous paper record. The focus of the report is the implementation of a Diebold system in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, but the report is essential reading for anyone who's interested in the ongoing debates regarding electronic voting. It's received a fair amount of coverage, including stories in the Columbus Dispatch and Cleveland Plain Dealer, as well as this cogent analysis from Dan Seligson of electionline.org...



So what was the cause of the major problems with the VVPAT records? Was it mechanical problems or inadequate poll worker training? It's hard to answer this question definitively, but I suspect that it's some combination of these and perhaps other factors.

In any event, the ESI findings suggest that there are serious practical problems with the implementation of present-generation VVPAT systems. We simply don't know whether VVPAT systems in other places have the same problems found in Cuyahoga, because no one's done a comparable analysis.

ESI's report certainly provides additional reasons for doubting the assumption that has been a prime motivation for making the VVPAT the official ballot of record -- namely, that paper records are necessarily more accurate than electronic records. The report suggests the potential for very serious problems in states that have passed such laws. Unless the mechanical and/or training issues found in the ESI report are resolved, it is quite likely that reliance on the VVPAT in recounts will lead to the wrong result in some future election.

http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/blogs/tokaji/2006/08/esis-report-on-vvpat.html

Search

http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&q=Cuyahoga+County%2C+Ohio+esi+report&btnG=Search

I. In Focus This Week


News Analysis: The Coming Paper-Trail Debacle?
Ohio report finds challenges abound in evaluating voter-verified paper audit trails
By Dan Seligson
electionline.org


A 240-page report on failures and foibles during Cuyahoga County’s May primary raised more questions about the accuracy and reliability of touch-screen voting machines which researchers say failed to match up electronic ballots to paper versions of the vote.

Perhaps equally significant – and noteworthy – are the details of the considerable woes that plagued the voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) system through careless election administration, printer failures or both.

Buried some 93 pages into the report, which was commissioned by county leaders and produced by the San Francisco-based Election Science Institute, are details of errors that included poll workers loading thermal paper into VVPAT printers backwards, blank audit trails, “accordion-style” crumpling of ballots, long blank spaces between ballots that could have represented missing or unprinted VVPATs, torn and taped-together VVPATs and missing ballot text.

ESI researchers found that nearly 10 percent of VVPAT ballots sampled were in some way compromised, damaged or otherwise uncountable, an alarmingly high proportion for a state that requires that paper be used as the ballot of record in the event of a recount.

That led ESI to the ominous conclusion that “in the event of a recount or election contest, the risk of legal challenges is exceptionally high if no significant modifications are made to the current election system.”

“The VVPAT is only as reliable as the administration of the system that produces the paper trail,” said Tracy Warren, the ESI researcher who led the manual VVPAT recount....

To critics, the high percentage of damaged or uncountable VVPATs damaged rated as significantly worse than ‘imperfect.”


“Ten percent is a complete disaster and totally defeats the purpose of a VVPAT,” said David Dill, a Stanford University computer science professor and founder of Verified Voting. “You can blame it on poll worker training, but there are ways to design equipment that makes user error less likely. There are indications that Diebold has done a less than adequate job in design. The company has adopted a generally reluctant and unenthusiastic stance to paper trails and it shows in the design.”

The answer to VVPAT problems, Dill said, would be precinct-counted optical-scan units.

“There are fewer questions about it,” he said. “We know with appropriate care and poll worker training, we can run a good election on optical scan.”..


http://www.electionline.org/Newsletters/tabid/87/ctl/Detail/mid/643/xmid/202/xmfid/3/Default.aspx

Brad Blog disputes the pair

Cuyahoga Co. OH: ESI Report on Diebold Primary Election Failure Bastardized By Anti-Paper Trail Pundits
'Experts' Ignore All But a Few Pages of a 240-Page Report
Guest Blogged by John Gideon


Election Science Institute (ESI) of San Francisco California was hired to investigate and report on problems with the May primary election in Cuyahoga County, Ohio. The 240-page report was just released this month (August), and some in the elections community have ignored a large majority of the report and zeroed in on a single aspect that supports their thesis that voters don't need any paper, even when voting on a Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machine.

Daniel Tokaji is an Assistant Professor of Law at the Ohio State University’s Moritz College of Law and the Associate Director of Election Law at Moritz. He has testified against a voter verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) to a US House committee and the Election Assistance Commission..

In his paper on the ESI report, Tokaji ignores many significant findings of the report and distorts the overall findings by highlighting only the compromised VVPAT. As pointed out by VotersUnite.Org in their analysis of the ESI report
...

http://www.bradblog.com/?p=3306

Avi Rubin Blog

...I find it interesting that different people on different sides of the issue have used this report to back up the claims they've been making all along. One thing that is absolutely clear to me, and something I believe pretty much everybody would agree on is that such studies are extremely valuable, and we need more of them.

...I will take this opportunity, as I have in the past, to respectfully disagree with Dan Tokaji, although not entirely. I will concede that the machines used in this study clearly did not implement an ideal paper audit trail. In fact, if you read the study, it is pretty clear that there were many faults with the paper audit trail. Where I part ways with Tokaji's is in his conclusions. I do not believe that the concept of a voter verified paper audit trail should be thrown out just because there was a poor implementation of it. In fact, if you consider a ballot marking system, where there is no electronic tally, such a system qualifies as a VVPAT, and would by its nature avoid many of the problems that arose in Cuyahoga County, Ohio...
http://avi-rubin.blogspot.com/2006/08/election-science-institute-report.html

Cuyahoga report highlights VVPAT challenges
While much of the discussion in the wake of the second Cuyahoga County report has focused on the questions about the report's audit of the voting devices (and the vendor's response to those questions), our friends at Electionline hit the nail on the head this afternoon.

A great piece in today's Electionline Weekly by Dan Seligson points to the data in the ESI-lead report on the problems the report highlighted regarding the voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT). It's worth quoting extensively from Seligson's piece, as it is the first media report so far that I've seen that has highlighted the fact that the report found that almost 10% of the VVPAT ballots studied were problematic...

http://electionupdates.caltech.edu/2006_08_13_archive.html

Report:

http://bocc.cuyahogacounty.us/

http://bocc.cuyahogacounty.us/GSC/pdf/esi_cuyahoga_final.pdf

http://www.caseohio.org/Cuyahoga%20News.html

Related

For Immediate Release: Monday, April 19, 2004
Electronic Frontier Foundation Honors Pioneer Award Winners
EFF to Honor Kim Alexander, David Dill, and Aviel Rubin at the Thirteenth Annual Pioneer Awards Ceremony...

The judges for this year's EFF Pioneer Awards were: Herb Brody (Senior Editor, Technology Review), Beth Givens (Founder and Director of the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse), Moira Gunn (Host, "Tech Nation," National Public Radio), Donna Hoffman (Associate Professor of Management, Vanderbilt University), Peter Neumann (Principal Scientist, SRI Intl.; Moderator, ACM Risks Forum), Drazen Pantic (Media & Tech. Director, NYU Center for War, Peace & the News Media), Barbara Simons (past President, Association for Computing Machinery & U.C. Berkeley Distinguished Alumnus), and Karen Schneider (Director, Librarians' Index to the Internet).

http://www.eff.org/awards/pioneer/2004.php

Bev Harris Vote Here

Also see Saul Iversen post

http://www.bbvforums.org/cgi-bin/forums/board-auth.cgi?file=/1954/45174.html