Tuesday, December 20, 2011

Newt Gingrich Political Ringer Pro Centralized FEMA Homeland Security

Newt Gingrich, in his own words, "centalized" government...

Alex Jones Infowars Nightly News 2011-12-05 video introduction of topic of Newt Gingrich hand in central role of government's FEMA and Homeland Security... at 2:02

... he's a ringer sent in to pose as a libertarian constitutionalist... but his actions, his fruits say the opposite here is Newt Gingrich just after 911... about how he had gotten Homeland Security set up...


U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
Hart-Rudman Commission

...The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, also know as the Hart-Rudman Commission, was chartered to review in a comprehensive way U.S. national security requirements for the next century. It began in Phase I by describing the future security environment this nation should anticipate, and in Phase II it delineated a strategy to address that future—to cope with the challenges and seize the opportunities that will constantly confront this great nation. Phase III was focused on changes to the national security apparatus, its structures and process, with an aim toward redesigning it as necessary to succeed in the security environment that lies ahead.

The Commission anticipated that it could not make credible recommendations to improve the national security apparatus without first understanding how that apparatus functioned. This document, Road Map for National Security: Addendum on Structure and Process Analyses, provides a thorough description of this country's national security organizations and processes as they existed in mid-2000.

Before institutional redesigns could occur, or before road maps could be constructed to get the national security apparatus headed in the appropriate direction, the Commission needed to understand how the government was structured and how it went about the business of national security. The seven volumes contained in the Addendum analyze key organizations and processes throughout the Federal government, to include the interagency and inter-branch levels. This Addendum provided a "baseline" of the national security apparatus, and was completed in draft form by the summer of 2000 as the Commission's main Phase III effort began in earnest. It thus laid much of the groundwork for Phase III. The first volume was updated and reedited in February and March 2001. The other volumes remain as originally written.To our knowledge no product has been previously produced that describes the national security structures and processes of the U.S. government in such detail. It should be useful to researchers and professionals seeking a detailed analysis of the national security system.


Following is an excerpt from archives FEMAtraining.fema.gov

In 1998, President Clinton and House Speaker Newt Gingrich petitioned Congress to form a 14-member panel called the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century (USCNS/21), also known as the Hart-Rudman Commission, to make strategic recommendations on how the U.S. Government could ensure the nation’s security in the coming years. The independent panel, created by Congress, was tasked with conducting a comprehensive review of American security with the goal of designing a national security strategy.

The Commission’s report, “Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change,” dated January 31, 2001, recommended the creation of a new independent National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. Government activities involved in homeland security. This agency would be built upon the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), with the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and U.S. Border Patrol (now part of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) within the DHS) transferred into it. NHSA would assume responsibility for the safety of the American people as well as oversee the protection of critical infrastructure, including information technology. Obviously, the Commission’s recommendations were not heeded before 2001, but many of its findings would later be integrated into the justification and legislation behind the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

Two other commissions were established to study the terrorist threat during these years: The Gilmore Commission and the Bremer Commission. The Gilmore Commission, also known as the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, produced a series of annual reports beginning in 1999 (with the final report released in 2003). Each of these reports presented a growing base of knowledge concerning the WMD risk faced by the United States, and a recommended course of action required to counter that risk.

The Bremer Commission, also known as the National Commission on Terrorism, addressed the issue of the international terrorist threat. The commission was mandated by Congress to evaluate the nation’s laws, policies, and practices for preventing terrorism, and for punishing those responsible for terrorist events. Its members drafted a report titled “Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism.” This report, issued in the year 2000, arrived at the following conclusions:

· International terrorism poses an increasingly dangerous and difficult threat to America
· Countering the growing danger of the terrorist threat requires significantly stepping up U.S. efforts
· Priority one is to prevent terrorist attacks. U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities must use the full scope of their authority to collect intelligence regarding terrorist plans and methods
· U.S. policies must firmly target all states that support terrorists
· Private sources of financial and logistical support for terrorists must be subjected to the full force and sweep of U.S. and international laws
· A terrorist attack involving a biological agent, deadly chemicals, or nuclear or radiological material, even if it succeeds only partially, could profoundly affect the entire nation. The government must do more to prepare for such an event
· The President and Congress should reform the system for reviewing and funding departmental counterterrorism programs to ensure that the activities and programs of various agencies are part of a comprehensive plan

Each of these conclusions and recommendations would take on great new meaning in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, and would guide many of the changes incorporated into the Homeland Security Act of 2002. However, in the absence of a greater recognition of a terrorist threat within the borders of the United States, no major programs were initiated to combat the growing risk.

Presidential Decision Directives 62 & 63

As these commissions were conducting their research, President Clinton was addressing other recognized and immediate needs through the passage of several Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs). Terrorist attacks continued to occur throughout the world, aimed at US Government, Military, and private interests. In 1996, terrorists carried out a suicide bombing at the US Military (Khobar Towers) barracks in Saudi Arabia, and in 1998, simultaneous bombings were carried out at the U.S. diplomatic missions in Kenya and Tanzania.

In May of 1998, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD-62): Combating Terrorism, which called for the establishment of the Office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism. The directive’s primary goal was to create a new and more systematic approach to fighting the terrorist threat. PDD-62 reinforced the mission of many U.S. agencies involved in wide array of counterterrorism activities. The new National Coordinator was tasked with overseeing a broad variety of relevant policies and programs including counterterrorism, critical infrastructure protection, Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMD) preparedness and consequence management.

Soon after this directive, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63): Protecting America’s Critical Infrastructure. This directive tasked all of the departments of the Federal Government with assessing the vulnerabilities of their cyber and physical infrastructures, and to work to reduce their exposure to new and existing threats.

Attorney General’s Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan

In December 1998, as mandated by Congress, the Department of Justice (DOJ), through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), began a coordinated project with other agencies to develop the Attorney General’s Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan. The FBI emerged as the Federal Government's principal agency for responding to and investigating terrorism. Congress had intended the plan to serve as a baseline for the coordination of a national strategy and operational capabilities to combat terrorism. This plan represented a substantial interagency effort, including goals, objectives, performance indicators and recommended specific agency actions to help resolve interagency problems. It clearly did not, however, tear down the walls that prevented interagency sharing of information, as evidenced by the failures that resulted in the success of the 9/11 terrorists.

General Accounting Office (GAO) Findings

The Department of Justice (DOJ) asserted that the Attorney General’s Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan, considered together with related PDDs as described above, represented a comprehensive national strategy to address the terrorist threat. However, after a thorough review, the General Accounting Office (GAO), Congress’s investigative arm, concluded that additional work remained, that would build upon the progress that the plan represented. The GAO contended that a comprehensive national security strategy was lacking.

In the GAO report GAO-01-55T: ‘Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National Strategy,’ released March 27, 2001, it is stated that the DOJ plan did not have measurable outcomes and suggested, for example, it should include goals that improve state and local response capabilities. The report argued that without a clearly defined national strategy, the nation would continue to miss opportunities to focus and shape counterterrorism programs to meet the impending threat. It also made the criticism that the DOJ plan lacked a coherent framework to develop and evaluate budget requirements for combating terrorism since there was no signal focal point. The report claimed that no single entity was acting as the Federal Government’s top official accountable to both the President and Congress for the terrorism hazard, and that fragmentation existed in both coordination of domestic preparedness programs and in efforts to develop a national strategy.

The GAO released another report in early September of 2001 (GAO-01-822) entitled ‘Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations,’ which it finalized in the last days before the terrorist attacks occurred in Washington and New York. The report stated that the Federal Government was ill-equipped and unprepared to counter a major terrorist attack, claiming also that from sharing intelligence to coordinating a response, the government had failed to put in place an effective critical infrastructure system. It further stated that,

“Federal efforts to develop a national strategy to combat terrorism...have progressed, but key challenges remain. The initial step toward developing a national strategy is to conduct a national threat and risk assessment...at the national level (agencies) have not completed assessments of the most likely weapon-of-mass destruction agents and other terrorist threats...”

To prevent terrorist attacks, the GAO recommended:

· A national strategy to combat terrorism and computer-based attacks
· Better protection for the nation's infrastructure
· A single focal point to oversee coordination of Federal programs
· Completing a threat assessment on likely WMD and other weapons that might be used by terrorists
· Revising the Attorney General’s Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan to better serve as a national strategy
· Coordinating research and development to combat terrorism

In a later report regarding Homeland Security, (GAO-02-610) ‘Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but Uncertainty Remains,’ the GAO called for more of the same in terms of needing central leadership and an overarching strategy that identifies goals and objectives, priorities, measurable outcomes, and state and local government roles in combating terrorism since the efforts of more than 40 federal entities and numerous state and local governments were still fragmented. It also called for the term Homeland Security to be defined properly since to date it had not.

September 11, 2001

The attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City, and the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, could arguably be considered the first national disaster event, outside of wartime, in the history of the United States. It is the first disaster in this country that impacted all Americans, leaving all citizens and communities with an unrelenting sense of vulnerability. The economic consequences of these attacks, felt in all parts of our country and, in fact, around the world, make this disaster event truly global in scope.

The attacks involved the hijacking of 4 commercial airliners by 19 trained terrorists. Three of the four planes were flown into major American landmarks – the two World Trade Center Twin Towers, and the headquarters of the United States military. The fourth, whose target may never be conclusively known, was prevented from reaching its target by passengers on the plane that overpowered its four terrorist hijackers. Almost 3,000 people were killed, and billions of dollars in property damage resulted. The full economic impacts, which include everything from lost revenues to increased spending on terrorism preparedness, may never be known.

This was not a simple act, but one that required years of surveillance, funding, training, intelligence gathering, practice, and breaching of United States immigration law. There were many instances during this time, as were evidenced in the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) (created to investigate the causes of the 9/11 attacks and means to prevent similar attacks from occurring the future), where individual agencies involved in counter-terrorist activities recognized one or more of these activities. However, insufficient coordination between the agencies prevented the Federal Government system of preventing terrorist attacks from piecing together the larger picture of what exactly was occurring, and as such, the terrorists were ultimately successful in their mission.

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Case 7 - FEMAtraining.fema.gov/.../ ...
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Case 7.2: The Homeland Security Act of 2002: A New Emergency Management ... In 1998, President Clinton and House Speaker Newt Gingrich petitioned Congress to ...... but President Carter created FEMA to centralize this Federal emergency


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